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All contracts made by corporations beyond their charter-

given capacities were ultra vires and absolutely void at common
law.' Even to-day, English courts apply this rule strictly. ' But
American courts have sought to soften the stringency of the rule,
and consequently have left the decisional law of ultra vires "in a
state of hopeless and inextricable confusion."'
West Virginia
cases have given little consideration to the problem; but it
seems that except in the case of corporations affected with
strong public interests,' the doctrine of ultra vires will be
avoided by some rule of estoppel,' retention of benefits,' or
'BALLATiNE, PRIVATn ConwoPATioNs (1927) § 67.
2 Hawkes v. Eastern Counties Ry., 1 De G. N. & G. 737, 760 (1852) ; Eastern
Counties Ry. v. Hawkes, 5 H. L. Cas. 331, 371 (1855); Ashbury Ry. v. Riche,
L. R. 7 H. L. 653 (1875).
Thompson, The Doctrine of Ultra Yires in Relation to Private Corporations
(1894) 28 Am. L. REV. 376. See Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codiflcation
and Restatement of the Ultra Vires Doctrine (1927) 36 YALr L. J. 297, 300308, where the author states the following rules on ultra vires as adhered to
by a majority of American courts: (1) A corporation is liable for the torts
of its agents done within the scope of their authority while carrying on ultra
vires business in which the corporation has engaged; (2) Although a corporation exceeded its authority in taking or holding title to property, the validity
of its title cannot be questioned on that ground; (3) An ultra vires contract
will be enforced if fully performed on both sides; (4) Either party to a
wholly executory contract may set up the defense of ultra vires; (5) A dissenting shareholder may enjoin a threatened ultra vires act; (6) Corporate existence is not ipso facto ended by the commission of an ultra vires act, but
the state may demand forfei-ure of the corporate charter. (7) There is no
agreement among American courts as to ultra vires contracts fully or partly
performed. West Virginia has held a corporation which has accepted the
performance of the other party cannot escape contractural liability by a plea
that it had no capacity to make the contract. The same rule probably will
be applied when the corporation has fully performed and the other party
seeks to set up the defense of ultra vires. See infra n. 5, n. 6, n. 7.
'National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U. S. 621, 25 L. ed. 188 (1878); Central
Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 53, 11 S. Ct. 478, 486
(1890); St. Louis Railroad v. Terre Haute Railroad, 145 U. S. 393, 12 S. Ct.
953 (1892); California National Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S. 362, 17 S. Ct.
831 (1897); Citizens' National Bank v. Appleton, 216 U. S. 196, 30 S. Ct.
364 (1909); Kerfoot v. Farmers' Bank, 218 U. S. 281, 31 S. Ct. 14 (1910).
5 Chafin v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 459, 102 S. E. 291 (1920)
(where a corporation president made an unauthorized contract and the corporation took the benefits thereof, the court said-the exact powers of the
corporation not having been shown-that by accepting the performance of
the other side, the corporation had ratified the contract and was estopped to
plead that its agent had no authority to make this contract.)
0 County Court v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 35 Fed. 161, 169 (C. C. D. W. Va. 1888)
(after holding the acts in question not ultra vires, the court pointed out that
the railroad had fully performed and said "a corporation cannot avail itself
of the defense of ultra vires when the contract has been in good faith fully
performed by the party and the corporation has had the full benefit of the
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laches.' The court has not clearly marked out the rights and
liabilities of shareholders, third parties, and the public.8 Consequently it is uncertain to what extent the English common law
or the American modifications apply in this jurisdiction. Legislation is necessary to clarify the matter.'
The problem for solution is obviously a complicated one. A
statute must attempt to prevent unenforcible contractual relations being established with third parties and at the same time
preserve, at least in part, both the stockholder's right to enjoin
unauthorized corporate action and the state's right to dissolve
performance of the contract"); Neil v. Flynn Lumber Co., 71 W. Va. 708,
713, 77 S. E. 324 (1913) (holding a contract by a lumber company to furnish
a competent physician to treat an employee for any sickness or accident occuring while in its service not ultra vires; the court saying a corporation could
not plead ultra vires when sued on a contract full performance of which the
other party had made).
7 Boyce v. Montauk Gas Coal Co., infra n. 8, where an equity court said a
stockholder having actual or constructive notice of a contract of which he
complains as ultra vires cannot wait an unreasonable length of time to ascertain whether the contract would result profitably, and then repudiate it if it
has resulted in loss.
I Boyce v. Montauk Gas Coal Co., 37 W. Va. 73, 16 S. E. 505 (1892) (holding parties dealing with a corporation are presumed to have knowledge of
the limitations upon its authority contained in the charter, but that in special
cases such parties will not be presumed to have this knowledge. The example
is given that if the question of authority depends not only on the law under
which the corporation acts, but also on certain extrinsic facts resting peculiarly within the knowledge of the corporate officers then the corporation would
be estopped to deny its want of authority and the other party would not be
This
bound to have had constructive notice of the charter limitations.
rule perpnits the court to apply or withhold the constructive notice rule at its
caprice, depending on whether it decides the plaintiff should have had notice
in a given case. Under this litigant would never know whether the rule would
be applied and his righhts defeated. A stautory abolition of this rule would
work no hardship and is entirely justified. The reason assigned for the constructive notice rule is that the legislature must have intended all persons to
be bound with notice of the articles of incorporation since it required them
to be filed in a public office. The fallacy is that this presupposes the legislative intent to have been to favor the corporation rather than the public.
0 Pennsylvania, for example, as early as 1876 adopted the majority rule on
ultra vires that the receipt of benefits under an unauthorized contract waived
a plea of want of authority to make it. Oil Creek & Allegheny R. R. Co. v.
The Pa. Transp. Co., 83 Pa. 160 (1876). This rule was followed until 1932,
when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in suddenly reversing to the ancient
common law rule, said that "contracts ultra vires of the corporation making
them are not merely voidable but wholly void and of no effect and no performance by either party can give the unlawful contract any validity."
Bedell v. Oliver H. Bair Co., Inc., 158 Atl. 651 (Pa. 1932). It is uncertain
what doctrine is now in force in Pennsylvania. This uncertainty and confusion can only be remedied by legislation. Cf. Knupp, Is Pennsylvania Swinging to the Federal .Rule on Corporate Ultra Vires Contracts? (1932) 36 DICK.
L. REv. 289, n. 13. (The term "unlawful" in the quotation above seems
rather loosely used here, since if the contract were truly unlawful it could
in no way be enforced. This error is common in cases on ultra vires contracts.
$ee Central Transp. Co, v, Pullmans Car Co., su ra n. 4.)
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the corporation or enjoin its acts.1 In short, the object of regulation must be the imposition of corporate responsibility within
the limits of reasonable corporate activity.'
10

A suggested difficulty with the "general capacity" doctrine is that while
it protects third parties dealing with the corporation, it also deprives the
shareholder who has been injured by the ultrm vires act of his protection.
This obstacle may effectively be remedied by additional provisions, as in the
proposed amendment, infra n. 28.
"See for example:
VT. GEN. LAwS (1917) §§ 4919, 4923, Laws (1915) No. 141, § 15. See.
4919: "A corporation shall have authority to do any lawful act which is
necessary or proper to accomplish its purposes . . . . " Sec. 4923. "Ultra
Vires acts; ratification. If an act done in behalf of a corporation is authorized or ratified by the directors or trustees, or such act is done within the
scope of authority given by the directors or trustees, such act shall, provided
that a corporation with authority to do such might, at the time it was done,
have been formed under the laws of this state, be regarded as the act of the
corporation and the corporation shall be liable therefor, even if such act was
not necessary or proper to accomplish its purposes, to the same extent that
it would have been liable for such act had it been necessary or proper to
accomplish its purposes."
OHIO GEN. CODE (Page 1926) §§ 8623-8 and 8623-9, as amended by Laws,
1927, p. 12 and Laws 1929, p. 416. See. 8: "Every corporation in this
state, heretofore or hereafter organized, shall have the capacity possessed by
natural persons to perform all acts, within or without the state.
"The articles shall constitute an agreement by the directors and officers
with the corporation that they will confine the acts of the corporation to those
acts which are authorized by the statement of purposes and within such
limitations and restrictions as may be implied by the articles.
"No limitation on the exercise of the authority of the corporation shall
be asserted in any action between the corporation and any person, except by
or on behalf of the corporation, against a director or an officer or person
having actual knowledge of such limitation."
Sec. 9: "The filing and recording of articles and other certificates pursuant to this act is required for thhe purpose of affording all persons the
opportunity of acquiring knowledge of the contents thereof, but no person
dealing with a corporation shall be charged with constructive notice of the
contents of any such articles or paper by reason of such filing or recording."
This section is based on the Uniform Business Corporation Act, § 10, which
has also been adopted in Louisana, Laws, 1928, Act No. 258, § 11 and Idaho,
Laws, 1929, c. 262, § 9.
Louisana Laws, 1928, Act No. 258, § 12: "Corporate Capacity and Corporate Authority: The Same Distinguished. L. A corporation which has
been formed under this Act, or a corporation which existed at the time this
Act took effect and of a class which might be formed under this Act, shall
have the capacity to act possessed by natural persons, but such a corporation
shall have authority to perform only such acts as are necessary or proper
to accomplish its purposes as expressed or implied in the articles or that may
be incidental thereto, and which are not repugnant to law."
Idaho Laws, 1929, § 10 is verbatim the Louisiana law above. This section
was based on the Tenth Tentative Draft of the Uniform Business Corporation
Act, which was soon thereafter approved by the National Conference on
Uniform State Laws and recommended to the several states for adoption.
CAL. CODE, HmvLER'S SUPPTL., 1930, § 355, Laws, 1929, c. 711, § 25: "gEffeet of Articles. The enumeration in the articles of the objects, purposes,
powers and authorized business of the corporation shall have no effect other
than as between the corporation and its directors or officers, as an authoriza-
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Modern legislation has sought to define the scope of corporate liability in terms of "general capacity", that is, of corporThe
ate liability for acts done in excess of the charter grant.
test of liability under such a theory is a test of "authority" as
in the agency situation. Thus the corporation will be responsible
for contractual obligations made with third parties in reasonable
reliance on corporate authority.'
The rule of the common law that the filing of articles of incorporation was notice to all the world of their content would,
of course, prevent the plea of reasonable reliance."8 Consequently some state ' require that articles be filed so that all persons
will have the opportunity to know the corporate powers, but
specifically declare that the filing of the articles will not charge
the public with "constructive notice" of the contents of the charter. In West Virginia, the rule of constructive notice apparently applies if the act done is obviously beyond the powers granted
by the corporation, but does not apply if the act done conflicts
with the powers granted only because of other extrinsic facts
known only to the officers of the corporation.' A more certain
test is desirable. It is not unreasonable to protect all executed or
tion to the directors and as a limitation on the actual authority of the representatives of the corporation.
",No limitation upon the business, purposes or powers of the corporation
contained in or implied by the articles shall be asserted as between the corporation or any shareholder and any third person. Such limitations may be
asserted in action by a shareholder or at the suit of the state, to enjoin the
continuation of unauthorized business, or to dissolve the corporation, or in an
action by the corporation or by the shareholders suing it in a representative
suit, against the officers or directors of the corporation for violation of their
authority.
"Any contract or conveyance made in the name of the corporation, which
is authorized or ratified by the directors, or is done within tthe scope of the
authority, actual or apparent, given by the directors, shall bind the corporation, and the corporation shall acquire rights thereunder, whether the contract
be executed or wholly or in part executory."
'-A corporation can clearly recover, under the agency principles governing
the "general capacity" doctrine, against a third party who knew the impending transaction was ultra vires when entering into it. However, it may seem
uncertain whether the legislators intended this defense to be used only when
the third party had actual knowledge that corporate limits were being overstepped. By analogy to settled agency principles, it is probable that the
corporation will be allowed this defense against a third party both where that
third party actually knew of the limitations and where he reasonably should
have known thereof but actually did not.
"BALA~nNE,

PRrVATE CoaPORATIONS (1927) § 79.

11See Statute, supra n. 11, wherein Ohio expressly abolishes.the constructive
'notice rule.
1Boyce v. Montauk Gas Coal Co., supra n. 8.
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partially executed transactions' made in bona fide reliance upon
the existence of corporate capacity."'
Some states have attempted to remedy the situation by marking out the situations in which the plea of ultra vires will not
be heard. That is done by excluding the plea in suits between
the corporation and a third party,' or between a stockholder and
a third party,' but permitting it in suits by the state or stockholders against the corporation or its officers.'
The Ohio legislation appears both to change the theory of
corporate organization and to enumerate specifically the results of
such change.' The limited capacity doctrine and the rule of conLack of authority cannot be
structive notice are abolished.
raised in litigation between a corporation and any person, but
the articles of incorporation constitute an agreement between the
corporation and its directors and officers which may always be
raised "by or on behalf of the corporation, against a director or
an officer or person having actual knowledge of such limitation.
This attempt to establish a general capacity doctrine and to define
Logically there is no reason why the protection should not extend to wholly
executory contracts but apparently only California has gone so far. The claim
of the third party to performance seems equal whether the contract is executory or only partially executed. The shareholder's demand that the corporate
assets be conserved is also equal. To draw a line between wholly and partially
executed contracts is thus an arbitrary division of interest.
ITSupra n. 3.
18But if the shareholder may enjoin the corporation the corporation may
by a circuity of a stockholders suit avoid all disadvantageous contracts. Cf.
OHio GEN. CODE, §§ 8623-9; Calif. Laws, 1929, ch. 711, § 25, supra n. 11.
19Cf. OHIo GEx. CODE, §§ 8623-8; Calif. Laws, 1929, ch. 711, § 25, supra
n. 211.
*The California statute, supra n. 11, so provides and thus has been criticized
as inconsistent:
"For if a stockholder's injunction against performing an existing
unauthorized contract is held to affect the other contracting party, the
express exemption of third persons from the effect of the defense of
ultra vires might be circumvented. On the other hand, if such an injunction binds only the corporation, corporate liability for breach of contract makes the stockholder's expressly granted right a hollow one. The
clauses might be reconciled somewhat by restricting the stockholder's
remedy to an injunction against future unauthorized contracts, provided
that such an injunction could be invoked against a third party who later
contracts with the corporation. Still it is doubtful whether the stockholder's rights were intended to be so emasculated."2 Note (1930) 44

HARv. L. REV. 284.

While there is no inconsistency as to future actions it is suggested that
future protection is ineffective to prevent the depletion of corporate finances
by present ultra vires contracts. See the proposed amendment, infra n. 28
as limiting shareholder's right to enjoin to future unauthorized contracts.
z See the Ohio Statute, supra n. 11.
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its effects raises these questions: (1) If corporations are to have
the capacities of natural persons will they have the power to en(2) What will be
gage in the professions now closed to them?'
the effect of the transaction being not only unauthorized but also
(3) Will executory contracts be given the full proillegal?'
tection of the statute?" (4) Is a stockholder's suit to enjoin unauthorized action a suit "on behalf of the corporation" within
(5) What effect do the new
the meaning of section 8623-8F'
(6) Does the
provisions have upon former special remedies?'
"agreement" between directors and officers and the corporation
impose liability for unintentional excessive exercise of authority?'
Most of these objections do not seriously damage the Ohio statute;
its operation is for the most part satisfactory.
A statute incorporating the best features of the legislation
in other states should be enacted in West Virginia. The desirability of a clear and certain rule for the protection of business
transactions is apparent, and this result may be accomplished
A proposed
without any serious change in the present law.
" Natural persons may, subject to regulations, engage in the practice of
certain professions such as law, medicine, etc. Corporations have been traditionally prohibited from engaging therein and, it is submitted, giving corporations "natural powers" should not be interpreted to admit them to the
practice of these professions. The proposed amendment avoids this difficulty
by expressly excepting the right to engage in such business. See infra n. 28.
OWhere the corporate act is bolh unauthorized and illegal, the Ohio statute
does not apply. Its operation is confined to legal action which is objectionabla
only.because it is beyond the purposes and limitations specified in the charter.
For example, the result is the same both before and after the adoption of
this statute if the corporate act is one which would be illegal if committed
by an individual, or which by law the corporation is expressly prohibited from
doing, no legal effect or protection will be afforded such act. See Stevens,
Ultra Vires TransactionsUnder the New Ohio General Corporation Act (1930)
4 Cnr. L. Rnv. 419 for a good discussion of this and other points arising under
the Ohio statute.
" See supra n. 16.
21It appears uncertain whether the Ohio legislators intended this to be ineluded in the phraseology used. If so, this statute is subject to the same
inconsistency as the California statute. See supra n. 20.
* The Ohio statute does not abolish or limit special remedies formerly afforded against the harshness of the ultra vires doctrine-an ultra vires act may be
enjoined or damages therefor recovered if the corporation is bound by such
act, both before and after this statute. The state may sue for forfeiture of
the corporate charter because of its unauthorized action. A corporation may
acquire both rights and liabilities on performed ultra vires contracts. The
statute in no way does away with these remedies, but on the contrary strengthens the reason for their existence and usage. See Stevens, op. cit. supra n. 24.
This action will probably not be applied where the directors were not negligent and reasonably thought their conduct was intra Vires (when in fact it
was ultra vires), especially 'where the boundaries of corporate authority are
not clearly delineated.
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amendments' to the present code section' should give legislative
definition to the existing doctrine of general capacity, remove
the threat of constructive notice, protect third parties who have
dealt in reliance on the corporation's power to act, and at the
same time preserve the rights and protections of shareholders and
the public.
--KNGsLEY R.

THE AMENDMENT OF WEST VIRGINA STATUTES. -

SMITH.

The recent

case of De Turk v. City of Buckhannon,' has cast doubts upon the
Inasvalidity of numerous amendatory statutes in this state.
much as the major portion of legislation is amendatory in form,'
a safe, simple, and practical amending device is a legislative necesThe following is submitted as an amendment to the present code provision-see n. 29, infra.
"Except for the carrying on of professions, every corporation of this
State shall have the capacity to act possessed by natural persons, but
shall have authority to perform only such acts as are necessary or proper
to accomplish the purposes expressed or implied in its charter.
"No limitation on the exercise of the authority of the corporation shall
be asserted in any action between the corporation and any person, except:
(1) by or on behalf of a corporation against a director or officer having actual knowledge of such limitation;
(2) by a shareholder to prevent the performance of a wholly executory
contract;
(3) by a corporation or shareholders suing in a representative suit
against the officers or directors of the corporation for violation
of their authority;
(4) by the State to enjoin the continuation of unauthorized business, or
to dissolve the corporation;
(5) in any action in which the liability of a public utility or banking
corporation is in issue.
"The filing and recording of the articles and other certificates pursuant
to this Act is required for the purpose of affording all persons the opportunity of acquiring knowledge of the contents thereof, but no person
dealing with a corporation shall be charged -with constructive notice of
the contents of any such articles or paper by reason of such filing or
recording."
W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 3, is the section defining the
powers of corporations, and to which the amendment is suggested.
1163 S. E. 812 (W. Va., 1932). In this case the court held unconstitutional a statute which sought to amend the charter of the city of Buckhannon by reference only. The statute (Municipal Charters, 1925, c. 35)
was in the following form: "That section fifty-six of chapter fifteen of the
acts of the legislature of West Virginia at its one thousand nine hundred
and nineteen session be amended and re-enacted by adding after the words
'one year' in the one hundred and fifth line of said section fifty-six the
The court declared this procedure invalid for failure to
following:
include the original section as amended.
2 Statutes are ordinarily in one of three forms: original, amendatory, and
repealing. The West Virginia Legislature in the 1929 session passed 164
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